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KENNETH R. WING, JD, MPH
Abstract: Until relatively recently, antitrust enforcement in the
delivery of health care was virtually non-existent.' Not even 15
years ago, many legal observers might have concluded that the
professional services of medical care providers were exempted from
the federal antitrust laws altogether; or that many providers were
engaged in local activities beyond the reach of federal interstate
commerce jurisdiction. Even 10 years ago, many providers were
Statutory Background
Most public health professionals are unfamiliar even
with the federal legislation itself. The original Sherman
legislation in the late 1800s, and the various amendments and
modifications to it in the ensuing century,2 essentially:
* prohibit the exercise of monopoly power or any
concerted attempt to restrain trade;
* attempt to specify certain practices that will be re-
garded as restraints on trade (e.g., interlocking directorates,
product tying arrangements); and
* provide for judicial enforcement of these prohibitions,
either by government agencies or by private parties.3
Most antitrust litigation involves allegations deriving
from one of the two basic substantive provisions originally
established by the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits concerted (i.e.,
two or more competitors) activities in restraint of trade:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or within foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...
Section 2 prohibits any attempt to exercise monopoly power:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . .4
Jurisdictional and Statutory Exemptions
The initial round of litigation that signaled the emerging
relevance of these prohibitions to the delivery of health care
began with a series of decisions in the 1970s. The US
Supreme Court rejected the so-called "learned profession"
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arguing that collective agreements among potential competitors
were not only sound public policy, but also that such concerted
activities were actively encouraged by various federal laws. Today,
however, the enforcement of the federal antitrust is an integral part
of the complicated legal environment of American health care
delivery. (Am J Public Health 1985; 75:407-41 1.)
exemption5 and firmly demonstrated its willingness to sub-
mit both the service delivery and the intraprofessional
activities of physicians and other professionals to antitrust
scrutiny.* The Court also rejected the argument that health
care services are local activities6; the Court held that virtual-
ly no institutional or individual providers are shielded from
antitrust liability by the "local activity" exemption.7**
The Supreme Court has also severely restricted the
possible exclusion from antitrust scrutiny of many health
financing activities under the "business of insurance" ex-
emption created under the McCarran-Ferguson legisla-
tion.8*** In 19789 and again in 1983,10 the Court affirmed that
the exemption applies to only those activities that: 1) involve
direct agreements between policyholders and the insurors;
and 2) involve the underwriting of risks. As the Court has
phrased it, McCarran Ferguson exempted from the antitrust
laws only the "business of insurance," not the "business of
insurors." Thus agreements between providers and health
plans or health insurors, even those that ostensibly limit
provider reimbursement or that are widely used in service
*The "learned profession" exemption derives principally from a reading
of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act limiting the federal antitrust laws to activities
that involve "trade or commerce." Traditionally, antitrust experts had argued
that the service delivery and intraprofessional activities of the "learned
professions," e.g., lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other high prestige, self-
regulated professionals, should be distinguished from other economic activi-
ties. While the exemption has been severely limited, the Court has left open
the possibility that at least some of the intraprofessional activities of such
groups with regard to ethical or quality standards may still be viewed
differently for purposes of antitrust analysis. [See 421 U.S. 773, 788-89; 435
U.S. 679, 695.]
**The "local activity" exemption also derives from a reading of the
language of the antitrust legislation, limiting the antitrust laws to activities that
involve commerce or trade between states or with foreign nations. The recent
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Rex and other cases: I) assume that
Congress intended by this language to allow the scope of the antitrust laws to
be as broad as the constitutional authority of Congress; and 2) require only a
showing of a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce and not necessarily
one that is either direct or intended.
***In 1945 Congress enacted the McCarran Ferguson Act expressly
exempting the "business of insurance" from federal antitrust legislation to the
extent that it was regulated by state law and did not involve "acts of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation." Apparently, Congress was concerned that the
antitrust laws should not interfere with the efforts of state insurance regula-
tory programs; and there was also concern that the determination of under-
writing risks might require some amount of cooperation among competing
insurance companies (e.g., sharing of data).
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benefit and insurance schemes throughout the country, are
potentially subject to antitrust scrutiny.
The Court has been even more restrictive in its defini-
tion of the "implied immunity" or "implied repeal" doc-
trine.t In a case followed closely by health planners through-
out the country, the Court ruled in 1981 that a Blue Cross
plan that refused to contract with a hospital, relying heavily
on the recommendations of the local health systems agency
(HSA) that the hospital had built "unnecessary beds," was
not protected from antitrust liability by either the fact that
the agency received federal funding or that the federal
government was encouraging the development of health
planning programs." The Court held that only those activi-
ties specifically required by the federal law or necessary to
carry out the objectives of the federal legislation, are exempt
by the "implied immunity" doctrine. Applying this judicial
posture to the federal health planning legislation (including
the "pro-competition" amendments of 1979), the Court
noted that at the time of the alleged violations, nothing in the
legislation either compelled or approved of the actions taken
by Blue Cross. The Court also noted that even if the HSA
had specifically requested that Blue Cross adopt such a
policy, at the time it would merely have been the recommen-
dation of a private agency, that received government fund-
ing. The local HSA was not carrying out a federally mandat-
ed responsibility or regulatory authority under state law.
Following the Court's lead in the cases above, other
courts have also severely narrowed the exemptions provided
for activities taken under the encouragement of "state
action''12tt and the "Noerr-Pennington"ttt doctrine ex-
tOne of the inherent difficulties in interpreting the scope and application
of the antitrust laws is the reconciliation of the essentially pro-competitive
dictates of the federal antitrust laws with the requirements and prohibitions of
various federal regulatory schemes, many of which promote or require
cooperative arrangements and other non-competitive behavior among individ-
uals or institutions otherwise subject to the antitrust laws. Where the courts
are unable to separately reconcile antitrust and other congressional mandates,
the courts treat any regulatory or other scheme enacted subsequent to the
antitrust laws as effectively repealing the application of the antitrust laws to
the extent necessary to carry out the new legislation. Since a variety of health
planning and regulatory efforts have been attempted by Congress in the last
several decades, many of which encourage and some of which require non-
competitive activities, many experts have previously assumed that the
"implied repeal" doctrine would provide antitrust exemption for a wide range
of cooperative and joint efforts in developing resources, and in the financing
and delivery of health care services.
ttBeginning with the Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), the courts have consistently read the federal antitrust
legislation to imply an exemption for state government activities, and also
activities sanctioned by state government-an exemption closely paralleling
the logic of the "implied immunity" doctrine. As the Parker v. Brown
exemption has generally been interpreted, private action is exempted as state
action only where: 1) the statutory sanction for the activity is clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; and 2) the private
activity is actively supervised by the state itself. Thus some efforts to
cooperate with state and local health planning agencies, and most efforts taken
under their direction should be exempted; nevertheless, the breadth of this
exemption should be read in light of the apparent reluctance of the Supreme
Court and other modern courts to allow broad exemptions from antitrust
enforcement.
tttThe seminal decision for the so-called "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine,
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1%1), ruled that any efforts taken to urge legislative action, even clearly
anti-competitive activities, were exempt from the antitrust legislation. Later
decisions ruled that the exemption applied as well to efforts urging executive
or administrative action by the government, as well as participation in judicial
proceedings. In later decisions it was argued that the exemption was both a
proper reading of the intent of the antitrust laws and that the exemption of
such activities was compelled by the First Amendment. Thus governmental
"petitioning" of any type, despite its purpose or intent, is exempt; exceptions
have only been allowed where the petitioning is shown to be a "sham"-a
dilatory practice or a subterfuge for a direct attempt to inhibit competition or
to inhibit the petitioning activities of a competitor.
empting actions involving governmental petitioning.'3
The overall message of these cases is that modern
courts view the federal antitrust legislation as establishing a
fundamental national economic policy, and are willing to act
as jealous guardians of this policy unless Congress clearly
indicates otherwise. The Supreme Court has insisted that it
must read the jurisdictional language of the antitrust legisla-
tion as broadly as possible, and must severely narrow the
applicability of any exemption or limitation imposed on that
jurisdiction. This message comes as no surprise to antitrust
experts; it has been adopted in the interpretation of the
federal antitrust legislation for some time. The message may,
however, be somewhat surprising for health care providers,
financiers, and planners who had frequently been advised
that the character of their activities, the significant involve-
ment in health care delivery of state and federal government,
and the "special status" of health care made the prospects
unlikely that they would be held answerable to charges that
they engaged in unreasonable restraints of trade, the exer-
cise of monopoly power, or the other acts prohibited by
federal antitrust laws.
Having opened the door to the antitrust scrutiny of
health care financing, various arrangements among provid-
ers and insurors, efforts taken ostensibly in compliance with
health planning, and virtually all activities involving the
delivery of services, the courts are now beginning to address
the merits of these issues: the practically and theoretically
difficult problem of applying substantive antitrust principles
to the various practices and arrangements that constitute
what the antitrust laws characterize as the "market(s)" for
health care delivery. '4 This is the second round of applica-
tion of antitrust law to health care delivery and its implica-
tions are just now unfolding.
Interpretation as Applied to Health Care Delivery
The gist of substantive antitrust analysis in most cases
involves the identification of unreasonable restraints on
trade or competition. Thus the basic inquiry is to apply the
so-called "rule of reason": the courts must analyze: 1) the
market(s) involved, i.e., who is selling what to whom; and 2)
the acts or practices involved to determine whether competi-
tion is unreasonably affected. The difficulty of such an
analysis is obvious. It requires the marshaling and interpre-
tation of a tremendous amount of information, often in the
face of disputed claims and allegations; and it requires the
weighing of the pro-competitive and the anti-competitive
effects of the contested acts or practices in order to identify
the net impact on competition in the market(s). In doing so,
the court must identify both actual market conditions and
those that would exist without market restraints or imperfec-
tions. This judicial inquiry necessarily requires the applica-
tion of a considerable dose of economic theory to the
circumstances of modern health care delivery, an analysis
that some critics argue is inappropriate and all agree requires
some complicated adjustment in the traditional economic
modeling of commercial behavior.
An important judicial doctrine that may be applied to
make this economic analysis more manageable involves the
application of the "per se" rule. As a court proceeds with its
economic investigation of an industry and of the practices or
activities alleged to violate antitrust laws, if the court
identifies a practice that has been traditionally atnd frequent-
ly shown to be unreasonable in other industries, it may
proceed no further than the identification of that practice.
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The court will forego the weighing of the anti-competitive
and pro-competitive effects of the practice under the particu-
lar cirdumstances. The practice ot activity is considered
unreasonable "per se." Whether and under what circum-
stances courts will apply a "per se" rule in analyzing various
health care markets are therefore important questions to
monitor as future decisions are handed down.
It should also be born in mind that, in the judicial
application of economic dnalysis, the reasonableness of a
restraint on trade is judged entirely by the impact on
competition: the federal legislation allows only pro-competi-
tive justifications for restraints on trade. Other social objec-
tives of anti-competitive behavior, e.g., the improvement of
the quality of the services rendered, are generally considered
irrelevant for purposes of antitrust analysis.
The application of even these most basic antitrust
principles to various aspects of health care delivery will be a
source of considerable controversy and uncertainty in the
coming years. The courts must define and analyze health
services, financing, and resource allocation activities in
terms of relevant markets and in terms that reflect both the
actual and theoretical impact of competition. And they must
do so in a legal environment at least partially skewed by such
factors as the peculiarities of health care financing mecha-
nisms and the historical pattern of governmental involve-
ment in virtually all these activities.
The most significant test to date of the current Supreme
Court's attitude was Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society.'5 In that case, medical care foundations maintained
by local physicians were setting maximum fee schedules
which participating physicians agreed to accept in full for
services to patients enrolled in health plans approved by the
foundations. Each foundation also performed peer review
and fiscal functions for the insurance plans. The Arizona
Attorney General brought an antitrust action claiming that
the local medical societies, individual physicians, and the
foundations were essentially fixing prices in violation of the
federal antittust laws. The defendants argued that their
actions did not constitute classic price fixing and that, given
the cost savings by consumers due to the maximum limits
established by the arrangements and the other advantages
for the health plans, such agreements should be viewed as
reasonable.
The Supreme Court held that the arrangements were the
kind of concerted restraint on competition illegal "per se"
under the antitrust laws, and the price fixing arrangement
was struck down without any further economic analysis of
its actual impact.
The Court's reasoning provides an excellent illustration
of both per se analysis and the rigor with which the Court
believes competition is protected by the antitrust laws. In
essence, the Court held that Congress has not given the
courts the discretion to consider whether under most cir-
cumstances anti-competitive activity can be fair or good
public policy. The only substantive issue, unless the activity
is exempted, is whether the arrangement has such a negative
impact on competition so as to constitute an unreasonable
restraint on trade. And where the act or practice is one of
several practices traditionally regarded as illegal "per se" in
other markets, that analysis is abbreviated and the negative
impact on competition is assumed. Once the Court conclud-
ed that the arrangement constituted price fixing, the Court
even indicated that if the effect of the price fixing involved in
the case had been in fact to lower prices, the cost of
eliminating competition would be presumed to outweigh any
advantages of the lower prices.
In its most recent antitrust decision involving health
care, the Court affirmed its commitment to a rigorous
enforcement of the antitrust laws, but had trouble defining
the specific principles to apply and the relevant markets
involved. Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde'6 involved an
exclusive contract between a private hospital and an anes-
thesiology group (Roux) under which the hospital agreed
that any patient receiving surgery would use one of the
group's physicians. As a consequence of this agreement,
when another anesthesiologist applied for hospital privi-
leges, he was denied. The physician sued in federal court
claiming that this constituted a tying agreement, one of the
specific restraints on trade prohibited under the federal
antitrust statutes.
Under antitrust analysis, a tying arrangement is a form
of marketing where a seller insists on selling two products or
services together. One product, the "tying product" is only
sold if the buyer agrees also to purchase another, the "tied
product." In their strictest form, tying arrangements are
considered an unreasonable restraint on trade and illegal per
se. The courts, however, have been somewhat reluctant to
treat all tying arrangements as illegal "per se". Only where
the buyer is actually forced to accept the second product is
the package sale regarded as an illegal "tying." Basically,
the seller has to be shown to have sufficient market power to
force the buyer to accept a "tied product" that the buyer did
not want at all or would have preferred to buy elsewhere on
different terms. Presumably, only such tying arrangements
force the buyer to do something that would not be done in a
competitive market and only such a forcing would either
exclude existing competitors or discourage new ones, tradi-
tional measures of anti-competitive impact. Thus, in order to
hold a tying arrangement illegal "per se", the court must not
only identify a tying arrangement but the kind of tying
arrangement prohibited under the antitrust laws. As a result,
the distinction between the threshold analysis for application
of a "per se" rule and the full analysis under a rule of reason
becomes somewhat blurred in tying cases.
In Jefferson, 16 Justice Stevens, speaking for an extreme-
ly divided Court (four justices concurred with the decision,
but dissented from the reasoning), conceded that there were
two separate products that were apparently tied together by
the seller. The hospital had argued that they were integrated
services and that they should be treated as one product. But
the majority found that there was no forcing of their pur-
chase. Looking to the market power of the hospital, the
Court held that the circumstances of hospital care in the
particular market area had not been shown to allow this
hospital to exercise sufficient forcing of a tied purchase.
Patients in the service area of the hospital had a number of
alternatives. Indeed, evidence indicated that a majority of
the patients in the market area went to other hospitals; thus,
patients wanting to purchase the tied product elsewhere or
on other terms were able to do so and the tying arrangement
did not inhibit their ability to exercise these options.
Having rejected the application of the "per se" rule, the
Court went on to apply the "rule of reason" to the tying
arrangements, i.e., to evaluate the actual competitive effects
of the exclusive contract. In a surprisingly brief analysis,
Justice Stevens rejected the allegation that the agreement
represented an unreasonable restraint on trade:
In sum, all that the record establishes is that the choice of
anesthesiologists at East Jefferson has been limited to one of
the four doctors who are associated with Roux and therefore
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have staff privileges. Even if Roux did not have an exclusive
contract, the range of alternatives open to the patient would
be severely limited by the nature of the transaction and the
hospital's unquestioned right to exercise some control over
the identity and the number of doctors to whom it accords
staff privileges. If respondent is admitted to the staff of East
Jefferson, the range of choice will be enlarged from four to
five doctors, but the most significant restraints on the pa-
tient's freedom to select a specific anesthesiologist will
nevertheless remain. Without a showing of actual adverse
effect on competition, respondent cannot make out a case
under the antitrust laws, and no such showing has been
made. 17
Jefferson may be a good illustration of the rule of reason
analysis. Obviously the contract between the hospital and
the anesthesiology group restrained trade and affected com-
petition. Patients could only buy the services of the hospital
if they accepted the group's physician services. But such an
arrangement did not have an unreasonable effect on competi-
tion: the Court found no showing that this contract put any
restraint on a market that would not be expected under
normal market conditions. Patients could still buy the serv-
ices of the plaintiff or any other anesthesiologist at other
hospitals. Thus, according to the Court, competitive condi-
tions still existed in the market despite the exclusive con-
tract. Conversely, however, had there been no other hospital
available in the service area, or even fewer hospitals, the net
impact on competition might have been analyzed differently
and the Court may have found a either forcing inherent in the
mandatory tying of the two products or a resulting net
impact on competition sufficient to violate the prohibitions
inherent in the antitrust laws.
Conclusions
This column has offered an introduction to the federal
antitrust legislation and to recent judicial decisions that have
indicated the court's enthusiastic intent to apply antitrust
principles to various aspects of health care delivery.
For public health professionals, who may have been
schooled to believe that health care delivery is through
"systems" and not "markets" and that health care cannot
or should not be modeled by reference to traditional eco-
nomic concepts, the recent judicial attempts to assess the
impact on competition of various financing arrangements,
provider activities, and even government encouraged plan-
ning efforts may appear a rather strained fit of economic
theory to actual practice. But however strained those efforts
may in fact be, the courts, led by the Supreme Court, have
clearly staked out the modern judicial posture: there is
nothing inherent in the nature of health care services or in
the manner in which they are provided or financed which
significantly alters the judicial function mandated under the
federal antitrust legislation. In the view of the courts,
Congress has established a fundamental economic policy
favoring competition. It has empowered governmental agen-
cies to carry out that policy, and allowed private parties
claiming harm from antitrust violations to seek private
judicial remedies, including individual liability for damages.
Nothing that the courts have encountered thus far has
persuaded them that this policy should be applied any
differently with respect to health care delivery than to other
economic activities.
How and under what circumstances this national policy
will be enforced as the Federal Trade Commission, state and
federal attorney generals, and private litigants assail insuring
schemes, planning programs, preferred provider agree-
ments, and the like, is very difficult to predict even for
antitrust experts let alone for public health professionals
whose introduction to antitrust law may well be rather
recent, or who may be predisposed to reject in whole or in
part the underlying assumptions of the antitrust laws. In-
deed, until those in public health can overcome this predis-
position to the basis for antitrust enforcement, neither
individual cases nor their implications may be adequately
understood or reacted to.
But part of the difficulty is inherent in these cases. The
antitrust laws, unlike virtually any other area of the law,
require that the courts in their interpretative function not
only give specific meaning and application to general legal
principles, but require as well that the courts divine that
meaning by application of the economic theory that is
essentially incorporated by reference into the federal legisla-
tion. The result is a judicial function that is unique and
inherently complicated, and particularly so when those
antitrust principles are applied to a new set of circumstances
and to an activity that fits into the mold of traditional market
analysis only with considerable shaping and qualification.
Moreover, as these cases demonstrate, the judicial function
relies heavily on the analysis of the specific arrangements,
the factual setting, and the prevailing market conditions at
the time of the alleged violation. Extending the decisions
enunciated in each case, particularly for purposes of antici-
pating future decisions, is necessarily speculative-even
when applied to industries or commercial activities with
which there has been some antitrust history, let alone to an
activity that has only recently come under antitrust scrutiny.
From a pragmatic point of view, it would probably be
best to view these initial cases as preliminary signals of
judicial intent, rather than predictive roadmaps of future
applications of antitrust principles to various aspects of
health care delivery. That is to say, the judicial interpreta-
tion of various "markets" and the impact on competition in
those markets is likely to evolve as antitrust principles are
applied to other circumstances and as the implications of
these cases are further refined. Or to put it somewhat
differently, while public health professionals would be well
advised to follow these and future cases closely and to seek
legal counsel as questions of their interpretation arise, the
counsel they receive will, or at least should be, cautious and
speculative.
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La Crosse Exercise Program Education Services Unit
1985 WORKSHOP SCHEDULE
CARDIAC REHABILITATION
April 15-19; June 10-14; July 15-19; November 18-22
Didactic and practical experience in cardiac rehabilitation Phase 1 (inpatient), Phase
11 (outpatient), and Phase 111, IV (maintenance). An opportunity to learn and observe
how to set up a total cardiac rehabilitation program.
TEACHING STRESS MANAGEMENT FITNESS AND
AND RELAXATION SKILLS WEIGHT CONTROL
June 2-7; July 14-19; Nov. 10-15 March 25-29; June 3-7; July 22-26
An indepth course of study dealing with These one-week workshops will help prepare
both theory and cognitive information, etc. health care professionals in administering
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE AND weight control programs.
INDUSTRIAL WELLNESS PROGRAMS For further information, and registration
BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS. material, contact:
La Crosse Exercise Program/June 10-13 Educational Services Unit
Emphasis will be on program development, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
implementation, and evaluation of some of La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601
the renowned programs in the U.S. (608) 785-8686
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